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ENCOURAGING FRAND-LY NEGOTIATIONS: A 
COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO ALLOWING 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN CASES INVOLVING 
FRAND-ENCUMBERED STANDARD-ESSENTIAL 
PATENTS  
INTRODUCTION 
Routers connect to a variety of devices, created by different 
manufacturers, allowing these gadgets— laptops, tablets, televisions and 
smartphones— to connect to the internet; these devices can communicate 
with the router and one another because they all belong to a common 
standard or standards.1 The Wi-Fi standard is one of the many relevant 
standards for the aforementioned devices. Like other standards, the Wi-Fi 
standard allows for devices to be interoperable because Standard Setting 
Organizations2 (“SSOs”) provide manufacturers of various devices, or 
components of those devices, with “common blueprints that specify the 
physical interface, communication protocols, and other features . . .”3  
Although participation in SSOs is voluntary,4 many entities choose to 
participate in  standardization processes5 that determine which patents are 
included in the blueprints every implementer of a standard will have to 
follow.6 The patents that are selected to be a part of the standard are 
known as standard-essential patents (“SEPs”).7 Because one of the 
property rights in a patent-holder’s “bundle of sticks” is the right to 
exclude others from practicing their patent,8 and because an implementer 
will necessarily need to license the patents essential to the standard in 
                                                        
1   Benjamin M. Miller, FRAND-Encumbered SEPS and Injunctions: Why Section 5 of the FTC 
Act is an Inappropriate Remedy, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 452, 454 (2015).  
2   SSOs are “private groups responsible for adopting industry standards.” Id. at 455. 
3   Jonathan Hillel, Standards x Patents ÷ Antitrust = ∞: The Inadequacy of Antitrust to Address 
Patent Ambush, 17 DUKE L. TECH. REV. 1, ¶ 7 (2010). 
4   See Miller, supra note 1, at 455.  
5    Standardization is “the adoption of a single standard by an industry for a given product or 
technology.”  Miller, supra note 1, at 455. 
6    “[A]ny entity wishing to practice that standard must obtain the right to use a particular patent 
necessary to the standard.” Miller, supra note 1, at 455. 
7   Miller, supra note 1, at 455. 
8   Miller, supra note 1, at 455. 
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order to comply with that standard,9 SSOs ask their members to declare 
any patents they believe to be standard-essential and to license those 
patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms.10  
This Note maintains that holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs should 
continue to have access to injunctive relief in United States courts as well 
as exclusionary relief at the United States International Trade Commission 
(“USITC”) in limited circumstances; the Note argues these limited 
circumstances should include instances of egregious knowing or willful 
infringement and instances where an implementer refuses to take a license 
on FRAND terms.11 The Note also argues that United States courts and 
the USITC should develop a set of guidelines outlining the obligations of 
participants in licensing negotiations over FRAND-encumbered SEPs, 
such as the “safe harbor” guidelines12 developed by the European Union 
in the Huawei v. ZTE litigation. Such guidelines would encourage parties 
to engage in good-faith negotiations by reducing opportunistic behavior, 
facilitating innovation and participation in the standard-setting process, 
and promoting economic efficiency.13 
Part II of this Note provides background on SSOs and FRAND 
commitments as well as patent infringement, injunctions, and special 
considerations involved in the licensing of FRAND-encumbered SEPs.14  
Part III examines United States legal precedent concerning the grant of 
injunctions and exclusionary relief in disputes over SEPs subject to 
FRAND licensing commitments as well as two key decisions from the 
European Union addressing the issue.15  Part IV highlights some of the 
reasons why injunctions and exclusionary relief should remain available 
to holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs16 and argues that the United 
States courts and agencies should develop guidelines outlining the 
obligations, and proper conduct expected of parties involved in licensing 
                                                        
9    If a patent essential to the standard could be withheld it could potentially result in high 
shifting cost for an implementer or exclude them from the market altogether. Miller, supra note 1, at 
455. 
10  Miller, supra note 1, at 455. 
11  See infra Section IV for further discussion of the argument.  
12  See infra Section III (B)(i), for the safe harbor guidelines developed in the Huawei v. ZTE 
case.  
13  See infra Section IV (A)-(D) for discussion of the benefits of a clear framework governing 
negotiations concerning FRAND-encumbered SEPs. 
14  See infra Section II (A)-(B), for further details on SSOs, patents, patent infringement, and 
injunctive relief.  
15  See infra Section III (A) for discussion of precedent in the United States and Section III (B) 
for discussion of European precedent.  
16  See infra Section IV (A)-(D). 
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negotiations over FRAND-encumbered SEPs.17 Part V concludes the 
Note, underscoring the benefits of developing a clear and comprehensive 
framework for licensing negotiations of FRAND-encumbered SEPs and 
delineating the instances in which injunctive and exclusionary relief 
remains available to holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs.18  
I.  BACKGROUND 
 A. Standard Setting Organizations and the Fair, Reasonable, and 
Nondiscriminatory Licensing Commitment 
SSOs produce technical standards, which are compilations of 
requirements for a given technical system.19 The patents covering the 
technology selected for the standard are deemed “standard-essential” and 
are required for the implementation of the standard.20  These patents are 
not necessarily more valuable or better than alternative patents for similar 
methods or products; however, once incorporated into the standard, 
implementers of the standard must use the SEPs to comply with the 
technical standard.21 
 Establishing a standard promotes innovation.22 However, standard-
setting also creates a risk of a hold-up because anyone implementing the 
standard will need to license the relevant SEPs. As a result, the holders of 
                                                        
17  See infra Section IV (A)-(D). 
18  See infra Section V. 
19  Garrard R. Beeney, FRAND and SEPs in the United States, LEXOLOGY (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=69a51066-a684-4ae0-8b23-06c489d52edb. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. There are numerous ways in which the standardization process may contribute to 
innovation and benefit the public. These include: promoting compatibility and interoperability of 
products, which benefits consumers by allowing them to choose from a variety of products from 
different manufacturers which can interact with one another and by reducing switchover costs; 
assuring minimum quality and safety of goods by ensuring all, or at least a diverse group of, 
stakeholders participate in the standard-setting process; and promoting the dissemination of 
information, including not only the technology underlying the standards but other related research as 
well. Knut Blind & Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, The Impact of Standardization and 
Standards on Innovation: Compendium of Evidence on the Effectiveness of Innovation Policy 
Intervention, INNOVATION-POLICY.ORG.UK (Feb. 2013), 
https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/the_impact_of_standardization_and_standards_on_innovation.p
df. Additionally, some studies have shown a positive relationship between participation in the 
standard setting-process and increases in investment in research and development and generation of 
innovative products. Id. at 25.  Furthermore, in some instances “standardization and standards can be 
efficiently used to select and coordinate superior IPR, to promote its diffusion and its enforcement.” 
Id. at 26. 
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these SEPs could attempt to extort greater royalties using their newfound 
market power, or refuse to license the patents at all.23  
To prevent this problem, SSOs require the licensing of SEPs to occur 
on FRAND terms.24 FRAND terms are supposed to allow the patent 
holder to make a reasonable profit while preventing the aforementioned 
hold-up problem by requiring not only that a license be issued, but also 
issued at a reasonable royalty rate.25 
 B. Patents, Patent Infringement, and Injunctive Relief 
SSOs promote innovation through their selection and incorporation of 
property rights, namely patents,26 into a standard. Patent rights are a 
                                                        
23  Beeney, supra note 19.  
24  Beeney, supra note 19. In a dispute involving SEPs burdened by a FRAND commitment, 
the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) policy of the relevant SSO should be examined for the specific 
language governing the commitment. See, e.g., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, District Court Holds That 
FRAND Commitment Does Not Require Licensing at Chip Level, SULLCROM.COM (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-District-Court-Holds-That-FRAND-
Commitment-Does-Not-Require-Licensing-at-Chip-Level.pdf (“careful consideration must be given 
to the language of the governing SSO IPR policy, as well as prevailing industry practice, in 
determining whether a licensing practice is consistent with a particular FRAND requirement.”). 
Furthermore, some scholars argue that the meaning of the terms “fair” and “reasonable” is determined 
in light of the wording of the relevant IPR policy as well as the rationale behind its adoption.  See, 
e.g., Damien Geradin, The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of Third-Party 
Determination of FRAND Terms, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 919, 956 (2014). In discussing the IPR 
policy of The European Telecommunications Standards Institute [hereinafter “ETSI”], a standard-
setting organization in the telecommunications industry, Geradin argues:  
The fact that FRAND is a voluntary contract between the SEP holder and other SSO 
members is key to understanding the notions of fairness and reasonableness that are 
critical to the concept of FRAND. For instance, the plain language of the ETSI IPR 
Policy, its legislative history, and the debates that follow its adoption make crystal 
clear that the FRAND commitment pursues a twofold rationale: ensuring access to the 
standard while guaranteeing that the SEP holder obtains fair and adequate 
compensation for its patents. The fairness and reasonableness (or adequateness) of 
licensing terms for SEPs should be determined in light of this twofold rationale and 
should also take into consideration the dynamic nature of standardization. 
Id.  
Additionally, in regards to the term “nondiscriminatory,” scholars have observed that “[t]here is 
indeed a consensus that non-discrimination does not mean that licensing terms should be 
identical for all licensees, as such an interpretation would ignore economic realities, but that 
‘similarly situated’ licensees should have access to the same licensing terms.” Id. at 928; see 
also, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 868-70 (2011); Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. 
Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531, 546 
(2013).  
25  Beeney, supra note 19. 
26  What is a Patent?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (June 7, 2016), 
https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/faq_patents.html (last accessed Nov. 11, 2018). 
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limited monopoly on inventions which are arguably granted in exchange 
for the disclosure27 of claims that are new, useful, and non-obvious.28 The 
United States patent system grants inventors a limited monopoly over 
patented subject matter in exchange for the disclosure of new inventions, 
which helps to promote innovation and thus benefits the public.29 The 
patent holder may exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, 
                                                                                                                              
A patent is an exclusive right granted for an invention. In other words, a patent is an 
exclusive right to a product or a process that generally provides a new way of doing 
something, or offers a new technical solution to a problem. To get a patent, technical 
information about the invention must be disclosed to the public in a patent application. 
Id. Following the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) 
Utility patents are granted for twenty years from the date of filing, and design patents are 
granted for fourteen years from the date of filing; however, prior to TRIPS, the patent term for a 
utility patent was seventeen years from the time the patent was issued. Patent, LEGAL 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/patent. See also 35 U.S.C. § 154 
(2012); 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012). 
27  See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
Chapter 2100, Section 2162, USPTO.GOV, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2162.html 
(last accessed Dec. 1, 2018),  (“The requirement for an adequate written description ensures that the 
public receives something in return for the exclusionary rights that are granted to the inventor by a 
patent.”); Amanda Murphy et al., Introduction to Intellectual Property: A U.S. Perspective, COLD 
SPRING HARBOR PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICINE, 5(8), a020776, available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4526723/ (“A patent is a legal monopoly that is 
granted in exchange for disclosure of how to make and use an invention.”). But see Alan Devlin, The 
Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 404 (2010) (“[T]he 
patent regime should primarily be construed as a tool for incentivizing the invention and 
commercialization of easily appropriated technology…disclosure should be treated merely as an 
ancillary feature of the patent system.”).  
28  See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-103, 112 (West 2014). The words “useful,” “novel,” and 
“nonobvious” are all terms of art within patent law. Ann Bartow, Copyright, Trademark and Patent 
Law: an Overview of the Intellectual Property Framework in the United States, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS, https://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C04/E6-31-02-03.pdf (last accessed 
Nov. 11, 2018). For instance, a patent claim is obvious when “the differences between the claimed 
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious 
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
[hereinafter “PHOSITA”] to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2014). 
Determining who the PHOSITA is in the context of a particular patent application and suit can be a 
complicated endeavor in itself. See, e.g., Naina & Jasmeet Gulati, Knowledge/Skill Standards of a 
“Person Skilled in Art”: A Concern Less Visited, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 588, 606 
(2018) (“The law is found in a great state of chaos when it comes to fixing the skill standard for 
PSITA/PHOSITA.”). 
29  See Devlin, supra note 27 at 405 (“[T]he [patent] system incentivizes the creation and 
commercialization of valuable technology, the disclosure of which often takes place as a byproduct of 
the technology's creation.”). See also The Patent and Copyrighting Clause of the Constitution, in 
which Congress is granted the power: “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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selling, or importing the technology covered under her patent for a period 
of twenty years after a patent has been filed.30  
When another entity makes, uses, offers for sale, sells, or imports an 
item that infringes upon the claims of the patent holder without her 
permission, patent infringement occurs.31 The patent holder can then bring 
an action against the infringing party, requesting both compensation and 
an injunction to halt further manufacture, use, sale, or importation of the 
goods.32 
Under United States law, injunctive relief is not necessarily available 
in all patent infringement cases; it is appropriate only in instances “when 
the remedy at law is inadequate,” meaning that damages are insufficient to 
provide “complete relief” to the aggrieved party.33 Thus, in patent 
infringement cases, where damages obtained for past infringement 
combined with a running royalty for future uses of the patent provide 
complete relief, a patentee cannot get an injunction.34 
In the United States, courts apply a four-factor test to determine 
whether permanent injunctive relief is appropriate, and their issuance of 
such an injunction is discretionary.35 This same test, sometimes referred to 
as the “eBay test,” is used in patent infringement disputes to determine 
whether a permanent injunction is appropriate.36 Under the eBay test a 
plaintiff seeking an injunction must show:  
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate 
for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy 
                                                        
30  35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 2014, Current through P.L. 115-231. Also includes P.L. 115-233 to 
115-270 and 115-272 to 115-277) (“such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the 
patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the 
United States ...”);  35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West 2014) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, 
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the 
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent 
therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
31  35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West 2014). Patent Infringement and Litigation, FINDLAW.COM, 
https://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/intellectual-property/patent-infringement-and-litigation.html (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
32  35 U.S.C.A. § 281 (West 2014); Patent Infringement and Litigation, supra note 31.  
33  Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd 
in part and remanded, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Significantly, the majority at the Federal 
Circuit affirmed judge Posner’s ruling denying Motorola’s, the patent holder’s, request for an 
injunction. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014)(“[W]e… affirm its [the 
lower court’s] decision that Motorola is not entitled to an injunction”).  
34  Id.  
35  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).  
36  Id. at 391. 
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in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.37 
 
Similarly, to qualify for a preliminary injunction under United 
States law, the plaintiff must show: “[1] that he is likely to 
succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 
interest.”38 Finally, where infringement involves the importation 
of goods, exclusion orders are available by bringing an action 
through the USITC.39  
 
C. Standard-Essential Patents and Fair, Reasonable, and 
Nondiscriminatory Licensing 
 
Typically, patent holders may attempt to seek injunctive relief in a suit 
against infringers, however, it has been less clear whether, and if so, under 
what circumstances, this right extends to patent owners of SEPs subject to 
a commitment to license  on FRAND terms.40 A patent holder who 
commits to licensing her patents on FRAND terms indicates that she is 
willing to provide a license on reasonable terms to all the implementers of 
the standard who require her technology.41 The crux of the issue is 
whether, and if so, under what conditions, a patent owner of a FRAND-
encumbered SEP should be allowed to ask for injunctive relief or an 
exclusion order against the infringing implementers.42 
 
 
 
                                                        
37  Id. 
38  Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
39  “The United States International Trade Commission ([US]ITC) has the authority to stop 
unfair trade practices, including the importation of products found to infringe a valid U.S. patent.” 
Maximillienne Bishop & Elizabeth Niemeyer, Limited Exclusion Orders at the ITC, FINNEGAN, (Sept. 
2013), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/limited-exclusion-orders-at-the-itc.html.  
40  Jay Pil Choi, FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents, CTR. FOR 
ECON. STUDIES & IFO INST. (Oct. 22, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512789. 
41  National Research Council, Patent Challenges for Standard-Setting in the Global Economy: 
Lessons from Information and Communications Technology, THE NAT’L ACADS. PRESS (2003),  
https://doi.org/10.17226/18510, 1, at 46.  
42  Id. at 47.  
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II.  ACCESS TO INJUNCTIVE AND EXCLUSIONARY RELIEF SHOULD BE 
AVAILABLE TO HOLDERS OF FRAND-ENCUMBBERED STANDARD-
ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
The worldwide examination of the issue — the availability of 
injunctions to holders of FRAND-burdened SEPs — has produced a near 
unanimous agreement “that a FRAND promise precludes seeking an 
injunction unless the infringer has refused to or cannot accept a FRAND 
licence [sic].” 43  However, there is some divergence in how this principle 
has been applied in the United States verses in the European Union.  
A. United States Legal Precedent  
1. United States Case Law 
American courts have been hesitant to allow the use of injunctions by 
holders of SEPs subject to FRAND obligations and have enjoined SEP-
holders from enforcing such injunctions, citing primarily three reasons. 
First, the act of requesting an injunction or otherwise asserting 
exclusionary rights is inconsistent with the FRAND commitment which 
requires patent holders to license their SEPs.44 Second, the undertaking of 
the FRAND commitment implicitly assumes that royalties are a sufficient 
remedy for the infringement in most cases because the commitment 
requires the patent holders to license out their patents.45 Third, 
negotiations under the threat of an injunction would disadvantage 
potential licensees and could result in an agreement with unreasonable, 
non-FRAND terms and rates.46  
                                                        
43  Beeney, supra note 19. See also Eric Kroh, EU Initiative Seeks Clarity of Standard-Essential 
Patents, LAW360 (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/913133/eu-initiative-seeks-
clarity-on-standard-essential-patents (indicating that U.S., E.U., and other foreign competition 
agencies have reached similar conclusions regarding the ability of FRAND-encumbered SEP holders 
to request import bans, product recalls, and other similar actions against willing licensees).  
44  See infra Section III(A)(i), for a discussion of Microsoft v. Motorola.   
45  Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 914 (“By committing to license its patents on FRAND terms, 
Motorola committed to license the ’898 to anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus implicitly 
acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to use that patent.”). 
46  Id.  
[A] royalty negotiation that occurs under threat of an exclusion order may be weighted 
heavily in favor of the patentee in a way that is in tension with the [F]RAND 
commitment. High switching costs combined with the threat of an exclusion order 
could allow a patentee to obtain unreasonable licensing terms despite its [F]RAND 
commitment, not because its invention is valuable, but because implementers are 
locked in to practicing the standard. 
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For instance, in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Judge Posner wrote the 
following in response to Motorola’s, the patent-holder’s, request for an 
injunction against Apple: “I don’t see how, given FRAND, I would be 
justified in enjoining Apple from infringing the ‘898 unless Apple refuses 
to pay a royalty that meets the FRAND requirement.”47 In taking on the 
FRAND commitment, Motorola essentially acknowledged that royalties 
are sufficient compensation for the use of its SEPs.48Significantly, Judge 
Posner also denied Apple’s request for an injunction in that case 
indicating Apple was not able to demonstrate that it suffered an 
irreparable injury, that a remedy at equity was warranted, and that the 
public interest would not be disserved by an issuance of an injunction as 
required by the eBay test.49 Finally, Posner acknowledged that allowing 
the FRAND negotiations to occur under a looming threat of an injunction 
could result in royalty rates which “reflect patent hold-up, rather than the 
value of the patent relative to alternatives.”50 
Likewise, in an interlocutory appeal, Judge Berzon, writing for the 
Ninth Circuit in Microsoft v. Motorola, upheld the grant of a preliminary 
injunction by a lower court to temporarily enjoin Motorola, the holder of 
RAND-burdened SEPs,51 from enforcing an injunction that it obtained 
against Microsoft in Germany.52 Motorola’s declaration to the 
International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”), the relevant SSO in 
that case, included the promise to “grant a license to an unrestricted 
number of applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis and on 
reasonable terms and conditions to use the patented material 
                                                                                                                              
Id. (Judge Posner citing a recently issued policy statement by the Federal Trade Commission in 
support of the proposition that injunctive relief is available for patent holders of FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs).  
47  Id. at 913-14 (emphasis added).  
48  Id. at 914 (“How could it [Motorola] be permitted to enjoin Apple from using an invention 
that it contends Apple must use if it wants to make a cell phone with UMTS telecommunications 
capability—without which it would not be a cell phone.”) (emphasis in original).  
49  Id. at 923. 
 50  Id. at 914. 
51  There appears to be little, if any, distinction between a commitment to license SEPs on fair, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) verses reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) 
terms. See Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and 
FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 312 (2014)(“The term ‘RAND’ for ‘reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory’ is used synonymously with FRAND.”); See also Raymond T. Nimmer, Joint 
standard-setting groups—Reasonable and nondiscriminatory licensing (RAND or FRAND)—What is 
a RAND or FRAND royalty?, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 4:59.60 (“Many standards 
organizations add the word ‘fair’ to the patent owner's obligation (FRAND). The word ‘fair’ is 
untethered to any case law. It adds virtually nothing to the rights owner's obligation.”).  
52  Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 889 (9th Cir. 2012).  
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necessary…”53 The Ninth Circuit found that exclusion of potential 
implementers of the standard, including through the use of an injunction, 
would be incompatible with the “sweeping promise” Motorola had given 
the ITU.54  
In Realtek Semiconductor v. LSI,55  Judge Whyte considered whether a 
SEP-holder was permitted to bring proceedings before the USITC seeking 
an exclusion order and an injunction against an implementer of the 
standard without violating the commitment to license the SEPs on RAND 
terms.56 The court held that the defendants, LSI Corporation and Agere 
Systems, breached their RAND licensing obligations because they failed 
to extend a licensing offer on RAND terms prior to filing the USITC 
action requesting an exclusion order and injunctive relief.57 Furthermore, 
Whyte stated that in agreeing to license the SEPs on RAND rates, LSI 
Corporation and Agere Systems implicitly agreed that monetary damages 
would be sufficient compensation for any infringing conduct.58 
Additionally, the court emphasized that potential licensees, such as 
Realtek, are harmed when SEP-holders pursue exclusion orders or 
                                                        
53  Id. at 876. 
54  Id. at 884. 
Motorola, in its declarations to the ITU, promised to “grant a license to an unrestricted 
number of applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable 
terms and conditions to use the patented material necessary” to practice the ITU 
standards. This language admits of no limitations as to who or how many applicants 
could receive a license (“unrestricted number of applicants”) or as to which country's 
patents would be included (“worldwide,” “the patented material necessary”). Implicit 
in such a sweeping promise is, at least arguably, a guarantee that the patent-holder will 
not take steps to keep would-be users from using the patented material, such as 
seeking an injunction, but will instead proffer licenses consistent with the commitment 
made. 
Id.  
55  Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
56  Id. at 1000-01. 
57  Id. at 1005-07.  
Similar to the situation in Motorola, here, defendants” are contractually obligated 
under their Letters of Assurance to the IEEE to license the '958 and '867 patents on 
RAND terms and Realtek is a third-party beneficiary to that contract (this is not 
disputed). Also, like in Motorola, the act of seeking injunctive relief (here, at the ITC 
before proposing a RAND license to Realtek) is inherently inconsistent and a breach 
of defendants' promise to license the patents on RAND terms.…Defendants' conduct 
in this case (bringing the ITC action before offering a license) is even more glaringly 
inconsistent with its RAND obligations than Motorola's request for an injunction at the 
district court after offering a license to Microsoft in the Motorola case.  
Id. at 1006 (emphasis in original). 
58 Id. at 1006-07 (“In promising to license on RAND terms, defendants here admit that monetary 
damages, namely a RAND royalty, would be adequate compensation for any injury it has suffered as a 
result of Realtek's allegedly infringing conduct.”). 
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injunctive relief in violation of their RAND commitments because they 
give the SEP-holders undue bargaining power that can be used to pressure 
the potential licensees into non-FRAND terms and royalties.59 Finally, 
Whyte noted that although an injunction was not appropriate in that case, 
injunctions may be appropriate in instances where infringers refuse to take 
a RAND license.60  
The court issued a preliminary injunction in the Realtek Semiconductor 
v. LSI case, barring defendants from enforcing a USITC order or 
injunction relating to the patents-in-suit prior to the completion of a full 
“RAND trial.”61 In addressing the likelihood of Realtek’s claim on the 
merits, the court emphasized that the defendants in this case were acting 
in violation of their RAND obligations in seeking an exclusion order and 
injunctive relief prior to the plaintiff refusing a license on RAND terms.62 
The court found a high likelihood of irreparable harm to Realtek’s 
reputation as well as customer and revenue loss if an injunction or 
exclusionary order would be handed down and enforced against it as a 
result of the USITC suit.63 The balancing of equities also came out in 
Realtek’s favor because allowing an exclusionary order to apply to 
Realtek’s products would have resulted in loss of its customers who use, 
sell, or import the products practicing the relevant standard and also force 
Realtek to conduct the RAND negotiation from a weakened position.64 
The public interest factors likewise favored Realtek because allowing a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from enforcing an 
                                                        
59  Id. at 1006 (“Realtek is harmed as a result of the breach because the pending threat of an 
exclusion order gives defendants inherent bargaining power in any RAND licensing negotiation that 
may now take place.”). 
60  Id. at 1007. 
While an injunction may be warranted where an accused infringer of a standard-
essential patent outright refuses to accept a RAND license… there is no indication that 
Realtek is not willing to accept a RAND license. In fact, Realtek admits that it would 
accept a RAND license, as long as it may preserve its rights to appeal and to maintain 
its defenses at the ITC, the venue in which defendants elected to pursue their 
infringement claims. 
Id.  
61  Id. at 1009-10. A “full RAND trial” alludes to the determination of patent validity and 
infringement, the reach of the RAND commitment, and the determination of the appropriate licensing 
terms and RAND rates.  
62  Id. at 1008-09.  
63  Id. at 1009. 
64  Id. 
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injunction or exclusion order against Realtek “[made] it clear that 
commitments to make patents available on reasonable terms matter.”65 
However, at least one United States court found that the precise 
wording of the FRAND obligations of a SEP-holder did not limit its 
access to injunctive relief.66 During the parties’ motions in limine in Apple 
v. Motorola  (“Apple v. Motorola  II”),67 Judge Crabb, in examining 
Motorola’s obligations to two standard setting organizations, the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) and European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”), found no language in 
the obligations to indicate an intent or agreement to prevent Motorola 
from seeking injunctions for its SEPs.68 Because patent owners may 
typically seek injunctions in district courts pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 283,69 
and in the International Trade Commission, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 
1337(d),70 the court reasoned that  “any contract purportedly depriving a 
patent owner of that right should clearly do so.”71 As there was no clear 
indication of removal of the right to seek an injunction in Motorola’s 
commitments to the two SSOs, Judge Crabb concluded that “Motorola did 
                                                        
65  Id. (citing to the Opening Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Jon Leibowits 
as Prepared for Delivery in In the Matter of Motorola Mobility and Google, Inc., at 3, FTC File No. 
121-0120 (Jan. 3, 2013), Dkt. No. 68-2).  
66  See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-CV-178-BBC, 2012 WL 5416941 (W.D. 
Wis. Oct. 29, 2012). Judge Robart, of the United States District Court for the W.D. of Washington, 
distinguished the factual circumstances of Microsoft v. Motorola from this case. See Microsoft Corp. 
v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1190 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (“This case, unlike those cases, 
presents a question not of direct breach of contract but of breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. Microsoft plans to argue that Motorola’s ‘whole course of conduct’ vis-à-vis Microsoft 
breached the RAND commitment, not just its decision to seek injunctive relief.”) 
67  Id. 
68  Id. at *15.  
69   “The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in 
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on 
such terms as the court deems reasonable” 35 U.S.C. § 283.  
70 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d).  
If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this section, that there 
is a violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles concerned, imported by any 
person violating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the United 
States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and 
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or 
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it finds that 
such articles should not be excluded from entry. The Commission shall notify the 
Secretary of the Treasury of its action under this subsection directing such exclusion from 
entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper officers, 
refuse such entry. 
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).  
71  Apple, 2012 WL 5416941 at *15. 
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not breach its contracts simply by requesting an injunction and 
exclusionary order in its patent infringement actions.”72,73 
2. Administrative Proceedings and Agency Recommendations 
Cumulatively, administrative proceedings and agency 
recommendations have likewise indicated that under most circumstances, 
issuance of injunctions to holders of SEPs was generally inappropriate; 
however, in limited circumstances, the possibility of injunctions for 
holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs remains.  
 
a. Policies of the United States International Trade 
Commission74 
 
There are a number of important differences between the operation of 
district courts and the USITC with respect to injunctive or exclusionary 
relief.75 First, the USITC’s investigations are conducted pursuant to 
                                                        
72  Id. 
73  While the recent TCL Communications v. Ericsson decision was a landmark decision for the 
purposes of calculating FRAND royalties, it is not discussed extensively in this note, which is 
primarily concerned with examining the existing frameworks governing negotiations over licensing of 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs and the availability of injunctions and exclusionary orders in such 
disputes. Michael Loney, Four Takeaways from the Landmark TCL v Ericsson FRAND Ruling, 
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Jan. 9, 2018), 
http://www.managingip.com/Article/3779666/Four-takeaways-from-the-landmark-TCL-v-Ericsson-
FRAND-ruling.html. For further reading on this case see Ericsson Inc et al v. TCL Communication 
Technology Holdings Ltd et al, 2:15CV02370, Final Judgement and Injunction (Dec. 22, 2017); 
Ericsson Inc et al v. TCL Communication Technology Holdings Ltd et al, 2:15CV02370, 
Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Dec. 21, 2017); David Long, Judge Selna 
determines FRAND Rate and enters contract-type injunction on ETSI SEPs (TCL v. Ericsson), 
ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2018/01/judge-selna-
determines-frand-rate-enters-contract-type-injunction-etsi-seps-tcl-v-ericsson/; Jorge Contreras, Guest 
Post by Prof. Jorge Contreras: TCL v. Ericsson: The First Major U.S. Top-Down FRAND Royalty 
Decision, PATENTLYO (Dec. 27, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/12/contreras-ericsson-
decision.html.  
74  The United States International Trade Commission [hereinafter “ITC”] is an independent, 
quasi-judicial Federal agency, which investigates matters related to trade. About the USITC, USITC, 
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). In addition to bringing 
a suit in a district court, a patentee can bring a claim of patent infringement at the ITC; although the 
USITC cannot grant money damages, it can issue exclusion orders that prevent the importation of 
infringing products into the United States. Jones Day, Standards-Essential Patents and Injunctive 
Relief, at 3, Apr. 2013, https://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/77a53dff-786c-442d-8028-
906e1297060b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/270fc132-6369-4063-951b-
294ca647c5ed/Standards-Essential%20Patents.pdf . 
75  There are also three key differences between seeking redress for patent infringement at the 
district courts versus at the USITC not related to infringement: first, USITC “investigations related to 
patent infringement are […] limited to importation-related infringement;” second, damages are not 
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Section 33776 of the Tariff Act, and therefore the eBay four factor test for 
awarding injunctive relief does not apply to its decisions.77 Second, the 
USITC is required78 to issue exclusion orders79 in cases where Section 337 
violations are present, unless public interests factors indicate otherwise.80 
                                                                                                                              
available at the USITC; third, USITC proceedings typically occur in a shorter time frame than most 
suits brought in United States district courts. An Overview of Section 337 Actions in the ITC, 
FINDLAW, http://corporate.findlaw.com/intellectual-property/an-overview-of-section-337-actions-in-
the-itc.html.  
76  Section 337, of the Tariff Act of 1930, covers investigations of unfair practices in import 
trade and is therefore used to determine whether unfair competition exists during the importation or 
sale of products in the United States, including whether the products infringe a valid and enforceable 
U.S. patent or other form of intellectual property rights. Understanding Investigations of Intellectual 
Property Infringement And Other Unfair Practices In Import Trade (Section 337), USITC, 
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/us337.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). 
77  See Jones Day, supra note 74, at 3. Prior to the 2006 eBay case, it was generally accepted by 
the courts that a showing of patent infringement entitled that patent holder to an injunction against the 
infringer; however, in response to the apparent problem of patent hold-up, the Supreme Court 
indicated the same four factor test used for injunctions generally needed to be satisfied in cases 
involving patent infringement. Doris Johnson Hines & J. Preston Long, The Continuing (R)evolution 
of Injunctive Relief in the District Courts and the International Trade Commission [hereinafter Hines 
& Long, The Continuing Revolution],  FINNEGAN, Jan./Feb. 2013, 
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/the-continuing-r-evolution-of-injunctive-relief-in-the-
district.html. See also eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Following the shift to 
this higher standard, patent owners pivoted to filing complaints with the USITC, which has the power 
to grant cease and desist orders and exclusion orders against infringing product. Hines & Long, The 
Continuing Revolution. 
78   See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). 
If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this section, that 
there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles concerned, imported 
by any person violating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the 
United States, unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public 
health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the 
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United 
States consumers, it finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry. 
Id. (emphasis added).  This means that it is easier to obtain exclusionary relief under Section 337 
at the USITC than it is to satisfy the equitable requirements under the eBay test at the district 
courts. See Hines & Long, Continuing Revolution, supra note 77.  
Although the rate at which district courts grant permanent injunctions to successful 
patent owners dropped from about 95 percent to about 75 percent after eBay, the ITC 
continues to grant C&Ds and LEOs to successful patent owners (with a domestic 
industry) as a matter of course. This means that the likelihood of obtaining injunctive-
type relief is about 25 percent higher for successful patent owners in the ITC as 
opposed to successful patent owners in the district courts. 
Hines & Long, Continuing Revolution, supra note 77. 
79  The relevant remedies the USITC may grant include: limited exclusion orders, temporary 
limited exclusion orders, general exclusion orders, cease and desist orders, and temporary cease and 
desist orders.  See Understanding Investigations of Intellectual Property Infringement And Other 
Unfair Practices In Import Trade (Section 337), supra note 80. 
80  Id. at 14. These public interest factors include: “the effect of such exclusion upon the public 
health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or 
directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers . . . .” Id.; See also 19 
U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).  
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Respondents in USITC investigations involving FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs have raised FRAND-based defenses81 and cited public interest 
factors as reasons for denying exclusion orders sought by holders of 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs.82 In a number of these investigations, the 
USITC requested submissions on the FRAND-related issues and public 
interest factors prior to deciding on the exclusion order in question;83 
these submissions were sought in accordance with 19 U.S.C. §1337(b)(2), 
which indicates that the USITC should consult with relevant departments 
and agencies, including the United States Department of Justice 
(“USDOJ”)  and the United States Federal Trade Commission 
(“USFTC”).84  
 
i. Recommendations of the United States Federal Trade 
Commission 
 
The USFTC85 submitted a third-party statement86 on the public interest 
in the ‘745, ‘752 and ‘794 USITC investigations.87 The agency stated that 
                                                        
81  See Jones Day, supra note 74, at 4,7. These defenses can include claiming the existence of 
an implied license, waiver, equitable estoppel, and unclean hands; additionally, typical counterclaims 
in investigation of patent infringement of FRAND-encumbered SEPs include both breach of contract 
and antitrust laws. Id.  
82  See Jones Day, supra note 74, at 6.  
83  See Jones Day, supra note 74, at 8.  
84  19 U.S.C. §1337(b)(2) (“During the course of each investigation under this section, the 
Commission shall consult with, and seek advice and information from, the Department of Health and 
Human Services, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and such other 
departments and agencies as it considers appropriate.”). The agencies which responded include the 
United States Federal Trade Commission, see infra Section III(A)(ii)(A)(a), The United States 
Department of Justice, and the Patent and the United States Patent and Trademark office, see infra 
Section III(A)(ii)(A)(b). 
85  The Federal Trade Commission is a bipartisan federal agency of the United States 
government which aims to protect consumers by preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair 
business practices. What We Do, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 22, 
2017). 
86  Third Party U.S.F.T.C.’s Statement on the Pub. Int., In re Certain Wireless Communication 
Devices, Portable Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 
337-TA-745 (“In re Certain Wireless”) (June 6, 2012), 
www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcwirelesscom.pdf.  
87  See Jones Day, supra note 74, at 7-9. Motorola was the complainant and Apple was the 
respondent in the ‘754 Investigation, titled Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music 
and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-745). Id. at 7. 
In the ‘745 Investigation, Motorola alleged Apple infringed a number of its telecommunication 
patents, including two patents which were subject to FRAND commitments under agreements with 
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”) and the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”). Id.  In the ‘752 Investigation, Certain Gaming and Entertainment 
Consoles, Related Software, and Components Thereof (Inv. No. 337-TA-752), complainant Motorola 
claimed Microsoft infringed its video encoding technology and wireless communication patents, 
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the “[US]ITC issuance of an exclusion or cease and desist order in matters 
involving RAND-encumbered SEPs, where infringement is based on 
implementation of standardized technology, has the potential to cause 
substantial harm to U.S. competition, consumers, and innovation.”88 The 
underlying concern was that the holders of RAND-encumbered SEPs 
could use the threat of an exclusion order to get unreasonable terms and 
rates for their patents despite having agreed to license them on RAND 
terms.89 The USFTC further argued that the USITC could rely on the 
public interest factors of Section 33790 to deny exclusion orders in 
circumstances where the holders of RAND-encumbered SEPs had not 
provided a RAND offer to the alleged infringer.91 In conclusion, the 
USFTC urged the USITC to “consider the impact of patent-hold-up on 
competitive conditions and the United States consumers.”92 
 
ii. Recommendations of the United States Department of 
Justice & The United States Patent and Trademark 
Office 
 
Likewise, the USDOJ93 and the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”)94 issued a joint statement.95 This statement 
                                                                                                                              
including patents with FRAND commitments to IEEE and the International Telecommunication 
Union (“ITU”). Id. In the ‘79, Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication 
Devices, Portable Music, and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers (Inv. No. 337-TA-
794), complainant Samsung alleged that Apple violated five of its patents, at least some of which were 
subject to FRAND commitments under Samsung’s agreement with ETSI. Id. at 8.  
88  In re Certain Wireless, supra note 86, at 1. 
89  See In re Certain Wireless, supra note 86, at 3-4 
Simply put, we are concerned that a patentee can make a RAND commitment as part 
of the standard setting process, and then seek an exclusion order for infringement of 
the RAND-encumbered SEP as a way of securing royalties that may be inconsistent 
with that RAND commitment… [T]he threat of an exclusion order may allow the 
holder of a RAND-encumbered SEP to realize royalty rates that reflect patent hold-up, 
rather than the value of the patent relative to alternatives, which could raise prices to 
consumers while undermining the standard setting process. 
90  See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). 
91  In re Certain Wireless, supra note 86, at 4 
Alternatively, the ITC could delay the effective date of its Section 337 remedies until 
the parties mediate in good faith for damages for past infringement and/or an ongoing 
royalty for future licensed use, with the parties facing the respective risks that the 
exclusion order will (i) eventually go into effect if the implementer refuses a 
reasonable offer or (ii) be vacated if the ITC finds that the patentee has refused to 
accept a reasonable offer. 
92  In re Certain Wireless, supra note 86, at 5.  
93  The United States Department of Justice (“USDOJ”) is an executive-branch agency tasked 
with enforcing the law and protecting consumers by promoting competition.  The Executive Branch, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/executive-branch (last visited Oct. 22, 2017); 
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underscored that an injunction or exclusion order may not align with 
public interests, especially where the terms of a FRAND commitment 
contradict such actions by the FRAND-encumbered SEP holder.96 In these 
instances, allowing the holder to obtain an injunction or exclusion order 
would amount to granting her the enhanced market power that SSOs 
attempt to restrain using FRAND agreements in the first place.97 Such 
enhanced market power has the potential to harm competition and 
consumers.98 Thus, the USDOJ and USPTO advocated for the USITC  to 
consider the statutory public interest factors under Section 337  prior to 
issuing injunctions and exclusion orders to holders of FRAND-burdened 
SEPs, suggesting such orders may be inappropriate under most 
circumstances.99 However, the USDOJ and USPTO indicated a request for 
                                                                                                                              
USDOJ and USPTO, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards Essential Patents Subject to 
Voluntary F/RAND Commitments, at 8, Jan. 8, 2013, (“USDOJ and USPTO”), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1118381/download. 
94  The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is an agency in the U.S. 
Department of Commerce tasked with granting patents and registering trademarks; the USPTO also 
“advises the president of the United States, the secretary of commerce, and U.S. government agencies 
on intellectual property (IP) policy, protection, and enforcement.” United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), COMMERCE.GOV, https://www.commerce.gov/doc/united-states-patent-
and-trademark-office#4/37.71/-99.48 (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). 
95  See USDOJ and USPTO, supra note 93, at 1.  
96  See USDOJ and USPTO, supra note 93, at 6. 
97  See USDOJ and USPTO, supra note 93, at 6. 
A decision maker could conclude that the holder of a F/RAND-encumbered, 
standards-essential patent had attempted to use an exclusion order to pressure an 
implementer of a standard to accept more onerous licensing terms than the patent 
holder 
would be entitled to receive consistent with the F/RAND commitment—in essence 
concluding that the patent holder had sought to reclaim some of its enhanced market 
power over firms that relied on the assurance that F/RAND-encumbered patents 
included 
in the standard would be available on reasonable licensing terms under the SDO’s 
policy. 
Id. 
98  See USDOJ and USPTO, supra note 93, at 6 (“Such an [exclusion] order may harm 
competition and consumers by degrading one of the tools SDOs employ to mitigate the threat of such 
opportunistic actions by the holders of F/RAND-encumbered patents that are essential to their 
standards.”).  
99  Jones Day, supra note 74, at 9 (“On January 8, 2013, the DOJ joined with the USPTO in 
issuing a statement that strongly urged the ITC to apply the statutory public interest factors to cases 
where the holder of a SEP, having made a FRAND commitment, seeks an exclusion 
order. The joint statement identified just two circumstances in which such an exclusion order might be 
appropriate: where the ‘putative licensee’ either (i) refuses to take a license or (ii) is ‘not subject to the 
jurisdiction of a court that could award damages.’ ) (emphasis added); See also USDOJ and USPTO, 
supra note 99, at 9-10(“[a]lthough, as described above, an exclusion order for infringement of 
F/RAND-encumbered patents essential to a standard may be appropriate in some circumstances, we 
believe that, depending on the facts of individual cases, the public interest may preclude the issuance 
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an exclusion order would be appropriate where the would-be-licensee: (1) 
is unable or refuses100 to take a license or (2) is “not subject to the 
jurisdiction of a court that could award damages.”101  In sum, both the 
USDOJ and USPTO requested that the USITC consider whether “a patent 
holder has acknowledged voluntarily though a commitment to license its 
patents on F/RAND terms that monetary damages, rather than injunctive 
or exclusionary relief, is the appropriate remedy for infringement.”102  
 
b. The United States International Trade Commission 
Decision in the ‘794 Investigation 
 
Despite these Recommendations from the USFTC, USDOJ, and 
USPTO, in one investigation, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, the USITC came out 
with a ruling for the holder of FRAND-burdened SEPs.103 In its ruling, the 
USITC found that Apple violated Section 337 and issued a limited 
exclusion order banning the infringing Apple products from importation 
into the United States.104 In addition, the USITC issued a cease and desist 
order, prohibiting the sale and distribution of the infringing products 
within the United States.105 This decision led to a public statement of 
disapproval of the USITC’s decision by the United States Trade 
Representative (“USTR”),106 which rendered the orders of the USITC in 
the ‘794 case ineffective under 19 U.S.C. §1337 (j)(2).107 
                                                                                                                              
of an exclusion order in cases where the infringer is acting within the scope of the patent holder’s 
F/RAND commitment and is able, and has not refused, to license on F/RAND terms.”). 
100  “Such a refusal could take the form of a constructive refusal to negotiate, such as by 
insisting on terms clearly outside the bounds of what could reasonably be considered to be F/RAND 
terms in an attempt to evade the putative licensee’s obligation to fairly compensate the patent holder.” 
USDOJ and USPTO, supra note 93, at 7. 
101 See Jones Day, supra note 74, at 9; See also USDOJ and USPTO, supra note 99, at 7.  
102 Goldstein et al., FTC/DOJ/USPTO Take Action on Standards-Essential Patents, 
BLOGS.ORRICK.COM (Feb. 4, 2013), https://blogs.orrick.com/antitrust/2013/02/04/dojftcuspto-take-
action-on-standards-essential-patents/.  
103  ITC issues exclusion order against Apple based on infringement of Samsung 3G-essential 
patent (Inv. No. 337-TA-794), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (June 4, 2013), 
https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2013/06/breaking-itc-issues-exclusion-order-against-apple-
based-on-infringement-of-samsung-3g-essential-patent/. 
104  Id. The Notice of Final Determination in Inv. No. 337-TA-794 is available at 
https://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/337/337-794_notice06042013sgl.pdf.  
105  Id. See also ITC releases public version of the Commission opinion (and dissent) in 
Samsung-Apple case (337-TA-794), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (July 8, 2013), 
https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2013/07/itc-releases-public-version-of-the-commission-opinion-
and-dissent-in-samsung-apple-case-337-ta-794/.  
106  Memorandum from Ambassador Michael B. G. Froman, The U.S. Trade Representative, 
Exec. Office of the President, to Honorable Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade 
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c. The United States Trade Representative’s Disapproval 
Under Section 337, the President, through the USTR, may, within a 
60-day period, disapprove of an order of the USITC on policy grounds, 
thus preventing it from going into effect.108 The USTR, Ambassador at the 
time, Michael B. G. Froman, wrote a memorandum to Irving A. 
Williamson, Chairman of the USITC, voicing such disapproval of the 
June 4, 2013 USITC exclusion and cease and desist orders against 
Apple.109 The USTR relied on the January 8, 2013 joint statement of the 
USDJO and USPTO in expressing his concerns regarding the order and 
specifically stated “exclusionary relief from the Commission based on 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs should be available based only on the relevant 
factors described in the Policy Statement.”110 The USTR requested that in 
future cases involving holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs seeking 
injunctive or exclusionary relief, the Commission: 
(1)  examine thoroughly and carefully on its own initiative the 
public interest issues presented both at the outset of its proceeding 
and when determining whether a particular remedy is in the 
public interest and (2) seek proactively to have the parties develop 
a comprehensive factual record related to these issues in the 
proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge and during the 
                                                                                                                              
Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Trade Representative Disapproval], available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF. 
107 19 U.S.C. §1337 (j)(2). 
If, before the close of the 60-day period beginning on the day after the day on which 
he receives a copy of such determination, the President, for policy reasons, 
disapproves such determination and notifies the Commission of his disapproval, then, 
effective on the date of such notice, such determination and the action taken under 
subsection (d), (e), (f), (g), or (i) with respect thereto shall have no force or effect. 
 
In this instance the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) was acting in his 
representative capacity as a member of the executive branch on behalf of the President—that is, 
the President disapproved of the actions of the USITC through the letter of the USTR. See Trade 
Representative Disapproval, supra note 106, at 1.  
108  Trade Representative Disapproval, supra note 106, at 1. 
109  Trade Representative Disapproval, supra note 106, at 3  
I have decided to disapprove the USITC’s determination to issue an exclusion order and 
cease and desist order in this investigation. This decision is based on my view of various 
policy considerations discussed above as they relate to the effect on the competitive 
conditions in the U.S. economy and the effect on U.S.  consumers. 
Id. 
110  Trade Representative Disapproval, supra note 106, at 2 (noting the two appropriate 
instances outlined in the policy statement as when: “a putative licensee is unable or refuses to take a 
FRAND license” or “a putative licensee is not subject to the jurisdiction of a court that could award 
damages”).  
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formal remedy phase of the investigation before the Commission, 
including information on the standards-essential nature of the 
patent at issue if contested by the patent holder and the presence 
or absence of patent hold-up or reverse hold-up.111 
Furthermore, additional guidance regarding the availability of 
injunctions in cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs can be found 
through examining USFTC settlement agreements.  
 
i. United States Federal Trade Commission 
Settlements 
 
Additionally, a number of USFTC settlements, including In the Matter 
of Bosch112 and In the Matter of Motorola Mobility,113 show voluntary 
outcomes of negotiations involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs.114 While 
these decisions are not legal precedent, they do provide valuable guidance 
to parties engaged in licensing negotiations of FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs.115  
Under the Bosch agreement, Bosch is obligated to license its SPX 
essential patents under FRAND terms and may seek injunctive relief only 
in the following instances: (1) a court determines the SEP is being used 
for a purpose other than to conform to the standard it is essential to; (2) a 
party, in writing, refuses to license the SEP(s); or (3) a party refuses to 
license the SEP(s) “on the terms which have been found to comply with 
the Letter of Assurance through a process agreed upon by both parties or 
through a court.”116 Although this settlement is only binding on Bosch, it 
indicates that as a policy matter the USFTC sees injunctive relief for 
holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs as appropriate only in exceptional 
circumstances.117  
                                                        
111  Trade Representative Disapproval, supra note 106, at 3.  
112  In the Matter of Robert Bosch GMbH, Decision and Order of the FTC in the Matter of 
Robert Bosch GmbH FTC File Number 121-0081 [hereinafter In re Robert Bosch], 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1210081/bosch-robert-bosch-gmbh. 
113  In the Matter of Motorola Mobility, Decision and Order of the FTC in the Matter of 
Motorola Mobility FTC File Number 121-0120, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/1210120/motorola-mobility-llc-google-inc-matter. 
114  David Healey & Andrew Kopsidas, Litigation Webinar Series: INSIGHTS-Injunctive Relief 
for Standard-Essential Patents, FISH & RICHARDSON (Dec. 4, 2013),  
https://www.fr.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Injunctive-Relief-for-
SEPs_November2013_INSIGHTS.pdf. 
115  Id.  
116  See In the Matter of Robert Bosch, supra note 112, at 14.  
117  Id. The exceptions listed in the paragraph were the only circumstances under which Bosch 
would be allowed to initiate or threaten to initiate proceedings requesting injunctive relief. Id. 
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Similarly, in considering In the Matter of Motorola Mobility, the 
USFTC viewed Motorola’s actions of requesting injunctive relief as a 
holder of FRAND-encumbered SEPs as abuse of market power because it 
sought injunctions against “willing” licensees.118  Commentators 
reviewing the settlement decree drew out a number of broad implications 
for both SEP owners and potential licensees.119 First, so long as potential 
licensees have not clearly indicated they will not pay a FRAND royalty, 
they will be deemed “willing” licensees and the SEP holder may not seek 
an injunction against them.120 Second, the FRAND commitment is non-
revocable under most circumstances.121 Third, holders of FRAND-
encumbered SEPs may request cross-licenses122 when these licenses are 
for SEPs belonging to the same standard as the SEPs required by the 
potential licensee.123 Fourth, the decree indicates that injunctive relief 
should be available under the following circumstances: 
[1] Potential licensee is not subject to United States 
jurisdiction; [2] Potential licensee has declared in writing 
                                                        
118  Jay Jurata et. al, FTC-Google consent decree provides important lessons regarding 
standards-essential patents, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 4, 2013), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4ba2ef45-bcae-4c93-87d5-f9a353db8f82.  To avoid 
being labeled as an unwilling licensee, potential licensees must respond promptly upon receipt of a 
notice of infringement and indicate their willingness to engage in good-faith negotiations. Id. One way 
to demonstrate willingness to enter good faith negotiations is to agree both to adjudication through 
binding arbitration or litigation and to abide by those terms.  Id. However, “[w]hile licensing 
negotiations are pending, potential licensees are not barred from challenging the validity, essentiality, 
claim of infringement, or value of the patents at issue;” moreover only a clear indication that a 
licensee will not pay a FRAND royalty, will be sufficient to show the licensee is unwilling. Id. 
Judging from the decree, a clear indication that a licensee is unwilling would have to be, or rise to the 
same level as the following instances:  
[(1) a p]otential licensee has declared in writing or sworn testimony that it will not 
accept a license for a FRAND-encumbered license on any terms; 
[(2) a p]otential licensee refuses to enter a license agreement for FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs on terms determined by a court or through binding arbitration; or 
[(3) a p]otential licensee fails to assure SEP owner, after an opportunity to do so, that it is 
willing to enter into a license on FRAND terms.  
Id. 
119  Id.  
120  Id. 
121  Id. Exceptions include instances where “the relevant standard no longer exists, the SEP 
owner no longer owns the SEPs encumbered by the FRAND commitment, or such SEPs are no longer 
enforceable.” Id. 
122  “When used in the context of patents, a cross-licensing agreement is an agreement pursuant 
to which two or more license holders exchange licenses so that each party may benefit from the 
other’s patent.” Cross-Licensing Agreement Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/cross-licensing-agreement/. Typically, patent holders enter into these 
agreements when each one has ownership of some of the intellectual property required to produce a 
certain product. Id.  
123  See Jay Jurata et. al, supra note 118. 
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or sworn testimony that it will not accept a license for a 
FRAND-encumbered license on any terms; [3] Potential 
licensee refuses to enter a license agreement for FRAND-
encumbered SEPs on terms determined by a court or 
through binding arbitration; or [4] Potential licensee fails 
to assure SEP owner, after an opportunity to do so, that it 
is willing to enter into a license on FRAND terms.124 
Moreover, the decree indicates that it is not appropriate for a holder of 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs to request injunctive relief while the potential 
licensee is seeking a FRAND determination through arbitration or judicial 
proceedings.125 Finally, in a transfer or sale of FRAND-encumbered SEPs, 
holders are required to obtain assurances that the party procuring the 
patents will carry out the FRAND obligations and will seek the same 
assurances from any future holder of the patents.126 
Thus, United States case law, administrative proceedings, agency 
recommendations, and USFTC settlements indicate that while under most 
circumstances the issuance of injunctions and exclusion orders to holders 
of SEPs is not appropriate, exceptional circumstances may warrant such 
actions.127  
 
B. European Legal Precedent 
 
Two recent court decisions illuminate the approach of the European 
Union to allowing holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs to petition for 
injunctive relief. The first decision is the ruling of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (“CJEU”) in Huawei v. ZTE,128 a seminal case 
outlining the basic framework used for negotiations over the licensing of 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs in the European Union. The second decision 
is Minister Justice Colin Birss’ opinion in the United Kingdom case 
Unwired Planet v. Huawei,129which is arguably a flexible application of 
the Huawei framework by an English court. Significantly, since being 
handed down, Huawei has been considered in resolving disputes over the 
                                                        
124  See Jay Jurata et. al, supra note 118. 
125  See Jay Jurata et. al, supra note 118. 
126  See Jay Jurata et. al, supra note 118. 
127  See generally Section III(A).  
128  Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp. (C-170/13) (CJEU 2015) [hereinafter Huawei], 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=165911&doclang=en. 
129 Unwired Planet Int. Ltd v. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd., [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat) 
[hereinafter Unwired Planet Injunction Hearing], available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2017/1304.html. 
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availability of injunctions for owners of SEPs in German, Italian, English, 
Romanian, and French courts;130 German courts have been the most 
prolific in writing on the application of Huawei, and the English courts a 
distant second.131 Additionally, in November of 2017, the European 
Commission issued a Communication on Setting out the EU Approach to 
Standard Essential Patents, which, relying on national case law, provided 
further guidance for the application of the Huawei framework. 132 
 
1. European Case Law 
 
a. Huawei v. ZTE 
 
Huawei v. ZTE provided much needed clarification regarding the 
obligations of parties engaged in licensing negotiations of FRAND-
encumbered SEPs.133 This case imposed a new, specific, and arguably 
sequential134 set of obligations on licensors and licensees in negotiating 
FRAND royalties.135 These general guidelines, or “safe harbors” are 
outlined below.  
                                                        
130  The 4iP Council is a European research institution which specializes in empirical research 
related to intellectual property and innovation. Case Law Post CJEU Ruling Huawei v. ZTE: About 
Us, 4IP COUNCIL, https://www.4ipcouncil.com/about (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). This organization 
maintains a repository, which, as of October 2018 contains forty summaries of decisions rendered 
post-Huawei addressing “the conditions under which a standard essential patent holder may seek 
injunctive relief for infringement of his patents;” decisions are available from German, Italian, 
English, Romanian, French, and Dutch courts. Case Law Post CJEU Ruling Huawei v. ZTE: 
Preliminary Remarks, 4IP COUNCIL, https://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).  
131  For instance, as of October 2018, out of the forty post-Huawei decisions published by the 
4iP Council, twenty-six decisions are from German courts and nine are from English courts. Case 
Law Post CJEU Ruling Huawei v. ZTE: German Court Decisions, 4IP COUNCIL, 
https://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/(last visited Oct. 21, 2018); Case Law Post CJEU Ruling Huawei v. 
ZTE: English Court Decisions, 4IP COUNCIL, https://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/(last visited Oct. 21, 
2018). 
132  THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE: SETTING OUT 
THE EU APPROACH TO STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS 9 (2017) (“EU APPROACH TO SEPS”).  
133  Christa Brown-Sanford & Bethany R. Ford, Post-Huawei FRAND Licensing of Standards-
Essential Patents, BAKERBOTTS (June 2016), 
http://www.bakerbotts.com/ideas/publications/2016/06/ip-report-post-huawei-frand-licensing. 
134  The Mannheim Court in Saint Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom did not indicate that the 
Huawei factors required sequential execution of the obligations. Id. However, the Oberlandesgericht 
Düsseldorf court (an appellate court) has indicated that after the initial obligation to provide notice 
and FRAND offer, subsequent obligations arise only if the other party meets the preceding obligation. 
Id. Under the Düsseldorf court’s interpretation of the Huawei factors, if the patent owner provides 
insufficient notice or fails to provide a sufficiently specific offer on FRAND terms, the licensee’s 
obligation is not triggered. Id.  
135  Id.  
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 (1) To comply with the FRAND commitment, the holder of FRAND-
encumbered SEPs must provide the alleged infringer with written notice 
of infringement,136 specifying the allegedly-infringed SEPs and their 
infringing use, prior to pursuing injunctive relief.137 
(2)  Following this, the alleged infringer must express her willingness 
to license the SEPs she infringes on FRAND terms.138 
(3) The SEP-holder must then provide the alleged infringer with a “a 
specific, written offer for a licence [sic] on FRAND terms, in accordance 
with the undertaking given to the standardization [sic] body, specifying, in 
particular, the amount of the royalty and the way in which that royalty is 
to be calculated.”139 
(4) The alleged infringer must respond “diligently” to the SEP-holder’s 
offer, “in accordance with recognised [sic] commercial practices in the 
field and in good faith;”140  
(5) If the alleged infringer refuses the SEP-holder’s offer, she must 
promptly141 present a written and reasonable counteroffer on FRAND 
terms to retain her rights to obtain a prohibitory injunction against the 
SEP-holder on the grounds of abuse of dominant position.142  
                                                        
136  The Manheim and Düsseldorf District Courts have indicated that the submission of claim 
charts is sufficient, and that the notice, at a minimum, should contain the number of the allegedly 
infringed patent, indicate the patent is standard-essential, and outline the allegedly infringing features 
of a product. Peter Chrocziel & Jan Bösing, Interpretation and Application of Huawei by German 
Courts, IAM MANAGEMENT REPORT (May 23, 2016), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/sep-
and-frand-2016-interpretation-and-application-huawei-german-courts. See also Landgericht 
Mannheim [LG] [Regional Court] Jan. 29, 2016, NTT DocoMo v. HTC, 7 O 66/15 (Ger.); Landgericht 
Dusseldorf [LG] [Regional Court] March 31, 2016, Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone, 4a O 73/14 (Ger.). 
137  Huawei, supra note 128, ¶ 61. 
138  Huawei, supra note 128, ¶ 63. While there is no uniform timeframe under which a response 
is considered timely, German courts have found waiting more than five months, three months 
constitutes unreasonable delay. Chrocziel & Bösing, supra note 136. See also Landgericht Mannheim 
[LG] [Regional Court] Nov. 27, 2015, St. Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom, 2 O 106/14 (Ger.); LG, 
Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone, 4a O 73/14. 
139  Huawei, supra note 128, ¶ 63 (emphasis added). 
140  Huawei, supra note 128, ¶ 66; The Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court has held that an 
alleged infringer of a standard-essential patent is required to provide a counter offer only if the initial 
offer is on FRAND terms, however other courts have ruled that a counteroffer is required regardless 
of whether the initial offer was FRAND, or that the initial offer “not contradict FRAND terms on 
summary assessment.” Chrocziel & Bösing, supra note 136 (citing LG, Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone, 
4a O 73/14; LG, St. Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom, 2 O 106/14; LG, NTT DocoMO v. HTC, 7 O 
66/15).  
141 While what constitutes a reasonably timely response is fact-dependent; the Manheim District 
Court found eighteen months constituted an unreasonable delay in providing a counteroffer and the 
Düsseldorf District court found six months to be too long of a delay. Chrocziel & Bösing, supra note 
136 (citing LG, NTT DocoMo v. HTC, 7 O 66/15; LG, Saint Lawrence v. Vodafone, 4a O 73/14).  
142 Huawei, supra note 128, at ¶ 66. 
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(6) Once an alleged infringer’s counter-offer is refused, it must 
“provide appropriate security,143 in accordance with recognised [sic] 
commercial practices in the field,” if she continues to use the SEP-
holder’s patented technology prior to the conclusion of a licensing 
agreement between the parties.144 
(6) Additionally, upon refusal of the counter-offer, the parties may 
agree to the determination of FRAND royalty by an independent third 
party.145 
(7) Both throughout and following licensing negotiations, the alleged 
infringer may challenge the validity of the asserted SEPs, their essentiality 
to a standard, and their alleged use.146 
b. Unwired Planet v. Huawei 
The United Kingdom Unwired Planet decision is another significant 
legal precedent because it creates a new, special kind of injunction, 
labeled by commentators as a “FRAND injunction.”147 Unwired Planet 
bought a part of Ericsson’s portfolio of SEPs and sued Huawei, Google, 
and Samsung Electronics for patent infringement in the United 
Kingdom.148 Google and Samsung settled, while Huawei continued to 
litigate the matter.149 Minister Justice Colin Birss held three technical 
trials addressing the validity, infringement, and essentiality of Unwired 
Planet's patents, finding two patents contained claims which were valid, 
                                                        
143  What constitutes an appropriate security is not clear, however, district court decisions have 
indicated that the security’s magnitude is a significant determinant. Chrocziel & Bösing, supra note 
136. For instance one Manheim District Court found that an alleged infringer must base its security on 
its counter-offer and another Manheim District Court indicated that where the licensing negotiation 
were for a worldwide portfolio, the security must be calculated based on a worldwide rather than a 
country-by-country bases; other German literature, however, suggests the SEP-holder’s offer, rather 
than the alleged infringer’s counteroffer, should be used to determine the security. Id. (citing LG, St. 
Lawrence v. Deutsche Telekom, 2 O 106/14; LG, NTT DocoMo v. HTC, 7 O 66/15; Paulzer, EuZW 
2015, 702). 
144  Huawei, supra note 128, ¶ 67. “The calculation of that security must include, inter alia, the 
number of the past acts of use of the SEP, and the alleged infringer must be able to render an account 
in respect of those acts of use.” Id.  
145  Huawei, supra note 128, ¶ 68. 
146  Huawei, supra note 128, ¶ 69. 
147  Simon Kahn & Rhodri Kendrick, The FRAND Injunction - What does it mean, LEXOLOGY 
(June 16, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7e09e81e-3616-496b-9b45-
b5871b0cb4ea. 
148  Kelcee Griffis, Huawei Hit with UK Injunction After Refusing License, LAW360 (June 8, 
2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/932737/huawei-hit-with-uk-injunction-after-refusing-license. 
149  Id.  
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essential, and infringed.150  Justice Birss also held a nontechnical151 trial to 
calculate the FRAND royalty rates and resolve key questions regarding 
FRAND terms.152  
After Huawei offered counter proposals in response to the court-
determined FRAND terms and royalty rates for Unwired Planet’s SEPs,153 
Justice Birss issued an injunction against Huawei.154 While Justice Birss 
stayed this injunction while Huawei appealed its case, he also laid out the 
guidelines for a novel type of injunction (“the FRAND injunction”), 
suitable for instances where an infringer refuses to abide by the court-
determined reasonable terms and rates for FRAND-encumbered SEPs.155 
The FRAND injunction automatically terminates if the infringer agrees to 
submit to a license on FRAND terms.156 Additionally, the FRAND 
injunction is unique because both the patent holder and the infringer may 
return to court to re-evaluate the terms of the FRAND agreement under 
certain circumstances, such as the expiration of the license.157 
2. European Commission’s Communication on Setting out the 
European Union’s Approach to Standard Essential Patents 
On November 29, 2017 the European Commission158 issued a 
Communication on Setting out the European Union’s Approach to 
Standard Essential Patents,159 which discussed several important topics, 
including the availability of injunctive relief under Huawei v. ZTE.160 The 
                                                        
150  Unwired Planet International Ltd v. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd, [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat)  
¶ 2, 9 [hereinafter Unwired Planet Nontechnical Trial], available at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2017/711.html&query=(2017)+AND+(EWHC)+AND+
(711); See also Kelcee Griffis, supra note 148. 
151  “Nontechnical trial” in this instance means a trial that did not concern claim construction of 
the patents, their validity, or infringement.  
152  Unwired Planet Nontechnical Trial, supra note 150, ¶ 3.  
153  Kelcee Griffis, supra note 148. 
154  Kelcee Griffis, supra note 148; Justice Birss wrote “By refusing to offer an unqualified 
undertaking before trial and before judgment Huawei forced Unwired Planet to come to court and 
vindicate its rights… The right thing to do now is grant a FRAND injunction albeit one which will be 
stayed on terms pending appeal.” Unwired Planet Injunction Hearing [2017] EWHC 1304 (Pat) ¶ 29. 
155  Kelcee Griffis, supra note 148. 
156  Kahn & Kendrick, supra note 147.  
157  Id. Under English law, regular injunctions are final “even when the circumstances of a case 
change.”  Id. 
158  The European Commission is the executive branch of the European Union which proposes 
laws to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union and enforces the laws of the 
European Union. European Commission, European Union, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/european-commission_en (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).  
159  See EU APPROACH TO SEPS, supra note 132.  
160  Id. at 9-10.  
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Communication relied on national case law in articulating guidance for 
applying the Huawei framework. 161 For instance, the Communication 
indicated prospective licensors need to provide potential licensees with a 
“sufficiently detailed” notice of infringement which identifies: the 
standard the allegedly-infringed patent is essential to, the allegedly 
infringing products, the proposed royalty calculation, and the supporting 
evidence indicating that the royalty rate is non-discriminatory.162 
Similarly, the Communication stated that counter-offers must be “concrete 
and specific,”163 and that the “timeliness” of the counteroffer was a fact-
specific inquiry, which is determined, at least in part, by the quantity of 
SEPs asserted and the level of detail of the infringement notice.164 The 
Communication also indicated that security, like damages, should be set at 
magnitudes which discourage patent hold-outs165 and that international 
portfolio licenses were permissible where consistent with the recognized 
commercial practices in the field.166 Finally, the Communication 
emphasized that injunctive relief should be effective, proportionate, and 
dissuasive, as per Article 3(2) of the IPR Enforcement Directive.167  
Thus, while the availability of injunctions in disputes over SEPs in 
Europe is subject to a patchwork of case law similar to that in the United 
States, the Huawei framework created a comprehensive set of rules for 
licensors and licensees to follow; moreover, the Communication from the 
European Commission on Setting out the European Union’s Approach to 
Standard Essential Patents provided further guidance on how the Huawei 
framework should be applied.   
III.  UNITED STATES COURTS AND UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE COMMISSION SHOULD CREATE GUIDELINES OUTLINING THE 
DUTIES OF PARTIES INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS OVER FRAND-
ENCUMBBERED SEPS, THEREBY ENCOURAGING GOOD-FAITH DEALING, 
                                                        
161  Id. at 9. 
162  Id. at 10.  
163 “[I]t [the counteroffer] cannot be limited to contesting the SEP holder’s offer and a general 
reference to third-party determination of the royalty.” Id.  
164 “[T]here is a probable tradeoff between the time considered as reasonable for responding to 
the offer and the detail and quality of information provided in the SEP holder’s initial offer.” Id. 
165 Id.  
166 Id. at 10-11. These portfolio licenses are permissible to the extent the patents are limited to 
SEPs that are necessary to produce and market the products. Id. Additionally, “SEP holders may offer 
more patents, including non-SEPs, but cannot require a licensee to accept a license for these other 
patents as well.” Id. at 11.  
167 Id. at 10 (citing to the Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, OJ L 195 of 2.6.2004, 16, 20).  
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FACILITATING INNOVATION, AND PROMOTING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
While there appears to be a consensus between the United States and 
the European Union that injunctions should be available on a limited basis 
in disputes involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs,168 United States courts 
have been more hesitant than the European Union in allowing injunctions 
in such cases169 and the tide may be turning on the USITC’s more liberal 
standard for allowing exclusion orders in these instances.170 This reticence 
may be due to the lack of United States guidelines concerning the 
obligations of the parties engaged in licensing negotiations over FRAND-
encumbered SEPs, in particular, the lack of clarity regarding the 
procedural responsibilities of the SEP-holder and the implementor of the 
standard throughout a negotiation.171 The divergent roles antitrust policy 
plays in the United States and the European Union may be another reason 
for the differing approaches the two take to injunctive relief in disputes 
involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs.172 In contrast to the United States 
                                                        
168  The United States Federal Circuit has indicated “there is no per se rule prohibiting 
injunctive relief against infringement of FRAND-encumbered SEPs” and the USITC has similarly 
concluded there is no “per se rule prohibiting an exclusion order against SEP infringement.”  Richard 
Li & Richard Li-dar Wang, Reforming and Specifying Intellectual Property Rights Policies of 
Standard-Setting Organizations: Towards Fair and Efficient Patent Licensing and Dispute 
Resolution, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 23 (2017). The decisions of the European Commission 
and the CJEU also seem to imply the same. Id. The consensus both in United States and European 
Union is that injunctions should not be issued against willing licensees, and should be reserved for 
instances where the would-be licensee acted in bad faith. Id. at 23-24.  
169  See supra Section III(A)(i), for a discussion of the United States caselaw. 
170  While investigations following the USTR’s disapproval of exclusion orders in cases 
involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs have shed light on the types of facts and evidence required to 
substantiate FRAND-based arguments, the entire Commission has not since then provided its 
comprehensive take on exclusionary orders of FRAND-encumbered SEPS. David W. Long, Litigating 
Standard Essential Patents at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 671, 
755-59 (2016).  
171  United States case law indicates that the FRAND commitment requires a good-faith initial 
offer, which does not have to be FRAND so long as a FRAND royalty or license eventually issues. 
See e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *15. However, the 
caselaw does not provide the sort of detailed step-by-step guidelines for the obligations of each party 
in a FRAND negotiation that Huawei v. ZTE laid out. See Huawei, supra note 128, at ¶ 103.  
172  Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Antitrust Policy Tools & IP Rights: U.S., Transatlantic & 
International Effects, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 441, 470-72 (2016).  
[T]he EU has historically been the jurisdiction focusing on enforcement rather than 
litigation from an antitrust policy perspective. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the EC 
has used competition related legislation to decide on cases potentially involving hold-
ups. Differently, the US has repeatedly stated that antitrust law and policy should not 
constrain the legitimate exercise of IP rights by for example stating that “we need to 
ensure that the application of antitrust laws does not illegitimately stifle innovation 
and creation by condemning pro-competitive activities that would maximize incentives 
for investments or efficiency-maximizing business arrangements.” 
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courts, courts within the European Union have been active in developing a 
body of law concerning the appropriate measures parties must undertake 
in order to comply with their FRAND obligations during negotiations.173 
United States courts and the USITC should likewise elucidate not only the 
appropriate circumstances for requesting injunctions in cases involving 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs, but also the sequential obligations of parties 
within a FRAND licensing negotiation to ensure holders of FRAND-
encumbered SEPs have access to injunctive relief in appropriate 
circumstances and to deter opportunistic behaviors of both parties.174  
A. Permitting Access to Injunctive Relied in Special Circumstances 
Will Restore the Appropriate Balance of Power between Licensors and  
Allowing injunctive relief in limited circumstances will encourage 
parties to engage in good-faith FRAND negotiations by increasing the risk 
associated with an implementer’s willful infringement, thereby decreasing 
her incentives to engage in a patent hold-out.175 The optimal balance of 
remedies in a FRAND dispute should mitigate both the risk of a patentee 
using the threat of an injunction to extract supra-FRAND royalties and the 
risk of an implementer engaging in a patent hold-out to obtain infra-
FRAND royalties because she would incur no additional risk from 
                                                                                                                              
 
Id. at 470–71 (citing remarks by Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust 
Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Presented at American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law 
Spring Meeting Washington, D.C. “US and EU Approaches to the Antitrust Analysis of 
Intellectual Property Licensing: Observations from the Enforcement Perspective,” 1 April, 
2004.).  
173 See Huawei, supra note 128, at ¶ 103; see also Christa Brown-Sanford & Bethany R. Ford, 
supra note 133.  
174 Admittedly, providing a comprehensive set of guidelines is difficult as there are no universal 
FRAND responsibilities, rather, each IPR policy contains specific language outlining the licensing 
obligations of holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs; therefore, the interpretation of the differing 
language contained in the various IPR policies becomes critical in judicial and administrative 
proceedings. David W. Long, supra note 170, at 755 (“[T]he ITC has given weight to the language of 
the IPR policy adopted by an SSO…The ITC’s focus on the language of the IPR policy includes what 
that IPR policy did not include…”). Likewise, the language of the SEP-holders’ commitments to the 
SSO differ, providing further interpretational challenges. David W. Long, supra note 170, at 756.  
However, the feasibility of creating a comprehensive framework is arguably evident through the use 
and application of the eBay four-factor test for injunctive relief, which is applied in the same way 
whether the patent at issue is a regular patent, a standard-essential one, or a FRAND-encumbered 
standard-essential patent; the courts apply the same framework in each instance, taking the presence 
of essentiality to a standard or FRAND commitment into account, without further specific guidance 
on the topic. Jorge L. Contreras & Ruchard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and Other 
Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451, 1460-62 (2015).  
175 Layne S. Keele, Holding Standards for RANDsome: A remedial Perspective on RAND 
Licensing Commitments, 64 KAN. L. REV. 187, 198 (2015).  
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engaging in willful infringement.176 If FRAND royalties are the only 
remedy, implementers have a perverse incentive to hold out because the 
most unfavorable outcome to the implementers would be to pay the same 
royalty rates177 they would have had to pay initially.178 The presence of 
injunctive relief as a potential remedy for certain types of infringement, 
such as willful or knowing infringement, would incentivize implementers 
to seek licenses and deter them from engaging in hold out because of the 
additional risk associated with engaging in those behaviors.179, 180 The risk 
to implementers is anchored in their sunk costs in technology or products, 
which rely upon the infringed SEPs; should an injunction be ordered, 
those sunk costs would be lost.181 Nonetheless, the availability of 
injunctive relief should be limited in order to ensure innocent 
implementers are not faced with the threat of an injunction182 and 
                                                        
176 Id. The situation in which no additional risk is incurred from willful, or knowing 
infringement is where the only remedy available to the owner of the FRAND-encumbered SEPs is the 
RAND rate, as opposed to circumstances where injunctive relief, enhanced damages, or attorney’s 
fees may also be awarded. Id. This scenario also assumes a singular RAND rate, rather a RAND range 
from which a number at the lower end of the spectrum would be agreed upon prior to the 
commencement of litigation and a higher value following initiation of the action. Id. at 229.  
Additionally, under these circumstances, the RAND rate determined by the parties pre-litigation will 
necessarily be the same as the rate determined by the courts. Id.  
177 This simplified illustration does not address the impact of litigation risk on the FRAND 
royalty rates. Id. at 229. Theoretically, court-calculated royalties should be higher than those 
negotiated between two parties prior to litigation because court calculations assume that a patent is 
valid and infringed while pre-litigation negotiations price in the risk that the patent may be found 
invalid or not infringed. Id. at 230. Moreover, the pre-litigation is also depressed due to the risk of 
non-mutual collateral estoppel, which would prevent the SEP-holder from enforcing her patent against 
any other party if it is found to be invalid in the action against just one implementer. Id. However, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether this increase in royalties offsets the litigation costs 
and other harms associated with litigation, in contrast to a bilateral negotiation culminating in a 
license.  
178 Id. at 201. It is true that attorney fees, and possible interest on damages might increase the 
pay out, however, these are balanced against the chance that the implementer may win at trial on any 
number of defenses, or that her infringement may not be detected in the first place. See, e.g., Id. at 
202. 
179 Id. at 203. It is possible to shift the balance of power between the implementer and the patent 
holder through other remedies, such as enhanced damages, but these are not addressed in this Note.  
180 See also Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, 
and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 308 (arguing that it may be socially beneficial to 
preserve injunctions in cases of willful infringement, and even in cases involving SEPs under limited 
circumstances).   
181 Layne S. Keele, supra note 175, at 203. “The threat of injunctive relief does not incentivize 
would-be infringers to seek a license if the infringers are not heavily tied down with sunk costs. Thus, 
a seller who simply imports patented products, marks them up, and then resells them would not 
necessarily be disincentivized by the threat of an injunction.” Id. at 203 n. 90.  
182 Layne S. Keele, supra note 175, at 211.  
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consequently, not deterred from investing into products which must 
comply with one or more standards.183 
 
 
 
B. Limited Access to Injunctive Relief Will Encourage Continued 
Innovation and Participation in the Standard Setting Process, 
Encouraging Economic Efficiency  
Granting FRAND-encumbered SEP-holders limited access to 
injunctive relief will reduce the likelihood of underpayment,184 ensuring 
innovators retain incentives to create the technology comprising novel 
standards and that the same innovators continue to participate in the 
standard setting process.185 Typically, the main concern in allowing SEP-
holders access to injunctive relief is that they will engage in hold-up 
tactics, attempting to extract supra-FRAND royalties from the potential 
licensees, who may be particularly vulnerable to this tactic due to the 
costs associated with switching to a different technology.186 However, 
SEP-holders and implementers “can and do bargain prior to the 
implementer’s adoption of and investment in a standard . . . .”187 In such 
instances, the bargaining occurs prior to the implementer’s investment, 
but after an innovator has sunk in research and development costs into its 
patented technologies.188 Categorically barring injunctive relief further 
“shifts the bargaining power from innovators to implementers,” especially 
in instances where innovators have already incurred costs and 
implementers have not yet done so.189 This shift in power results in lower 
                                                        
183 One proposed solution which would ensure innocent implementers of the standard are not 
subject to injunctions removes pre-litigation conduct from the analysis examining the need for 
injunctive relief.  Layne S. Keele, supra note 175, at 211. 
184 The term “underpayment” reflects the scenario in which implementers may underpay for 
royalty licenses, as opposed to overpay, in relation to some “true” value of the intellectual property; 
this underpayment may potentially “pose the risk of under-rewarding innovators for their 
investments” in the research and development process that led to the patented technology at issue. 
Luke Froeb & Mikhael Shor, Innovators, Implementers, and Two-Sided Hold-Up, 14-6 ANTITRUST 
SRC. 1, 9-10 (2015). 
185 Id.   
186 Id. at 7-8. Alternatively, in the absence of an alternative technology, or if the switching costs 
are too high, the implementer of the standard would be forced out of the market. See Miller, supra 
note 1, at 455; Layne S. Keele, supra note 175, at 205. 
187 Luke Froeb & Mikhael Shor, supra note 184, at 10.  
188 Id. at 7-8. 
189 Id. at 8.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
754    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW    [VOL. 18:723 
 
 
 
 
negotiated royalty rates, which could deter innovators from pursuing 
future projects because these opportunities would no longer be 
economically attractive.190 A categorical bar or overly stringent limitation 
on the grants of injunctive relief in cases involving FRAND-encumbered 
SEPs would likewise reduce incentives for innovators to be involved in 
the standard-setting process.191 Coupled together, the decline in 
innovation and the reduction in benefits produced by the various 
standardization initiatives would lead to a drop in economic efficiency 
and be detrimental to society.192, 193 
C. Negotiations with Willing Licensees Would Not Occur Under “the 
Looming Threat of an Injunction” Because a Court Mandated Royalty 
Will Always be an Alternative 
Bargaining occurs “in the shadow of the law that courts create,”194 
which means that the applicable case law will necessarily affect the way 
in which negotiations over licensing of FRAND-encumbered SEPs 
proceed. Similar to the model proposed by James Ratliff,195 the 
availability of injunctive relief in licensing disputes over FRAND-
encumbered SEPs within the existing framework196 of laws does not result 
in a hold-up because a willing licensee always retains the option to accept 
either court-determined FRAND terms or the terms it arrives to with the 
                                                        
190 Id.  
191 Id. at 8, 10. 
192 Id. at 10 (“Curtailing injunctive relief and basing royalties on the smallest salable component 
both pose the risk of under-rewarding innovators for their investments. This is likely to retard 
innovation, reduce incentives to participate in standards, and reduce economic welfare.”).  
193 Another intriguing argument in support of allowing access to injunctive relief is that it allows 
a closer approximation of ex-ante bargaining. Id. at 8-9. The hypothetical ex-ante negotiation, which 
occurs under the Georgia Pacific analysis in cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs, takes place 
prior to the adoption of the patent-in-suit into the standard. Id. However, in a truly ex-ante negotiation 
the holder of the patent could refuse to license its technology prior its adoption to the standard, giving 
the patent-holder additional leverage to bargain for higher royalty. Id. Thus, allowing for injunctive 
relief in some exceptional cases “can be seen as a partially restorative of the bargaining power that the 
innovator has before the existence of the standard.” Id. at 9. One pitfall of this argument, however, is 
that the higher royalty the patent-holder may have gotten would likely have come from fewer 
licensees. See James Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Use and Threat of Injunctions in the Rand 
Context, J. OF COMPETITION L. & ECON. (2013) 9(1): 4.  
194 William H. Page, Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/RAMD and Antitrust Injury, 22 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 181, 207 (2014).  
195 See generally Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 193, at 1-22.  
196 “Remedies for patent infringement are particularly important because they set the framework 
for licensing negotiations and provide the source of the patentee’s power to extract monopoly rents 
from standardized products.” Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of 
Patent Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 889-90 (2011). 
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SEP-holder.197 In other words, “the negotiation is not conducted in the 
shadow of an injunctive threat but rather in the shadow of knowledge that 
the court will impose a set of RAND terms if the parties do not reach 
agreement themselves.”198, 199 Similarly to Ratliff’s model, under United 
States case law and USITC decisions, the circumstances under which 
injunctions would issue are limited, consisting of instances where an 
implementer and SEP-holder are at an impasse and where the 
implementer refuses to license on court-determined FRAND terms.200 
Thus, availability of injunctions infor instances of egregious, willful 
infringement, will not harm willing licensees and will help to facilitate 
dispute resolution.201   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
197  See Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 193, at 18-19.  
198 Id. at 9. One assumption in the above scenario is that the obligation of an owner of FRAND-
encumbered SEPs to offer a FRAND license is not dissolved by a challenge of the offer in court, nor 
by a court determination that the SEP-holder’s opening offer was FRAND; in other words, the patent 
holder’s duty is not discharged upon a single offer of a license on FRAND terms.  Id.  
199 It is important to note, where the actual wording of a FRAND commitment is a requirement 
for a SEP-holder to offer the SEPs on FRAND terms, some economists believe that SEP-holders who 
inform an implementer of infringement and provide an offer on FRAND terms, which is sufficiently 
specific to constitute a binding agreement if accepted by the implementer, fully discharge their 
contractual duties. J. Gregory Sidak, Comments on the Japan Guidelines for Licensing Negotiations 
Involving Standard-Essential Patents, CRITERION ECONOMICS (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://www.criterioneconomics.com/sidak-comments-japan-patent-office-sep-guidelines.html. Under 
this line of reasoning, if the implementer rejects the offer, or makes a counteroffer, the SEP-holder is 
under no obligation to negotiate or accept the counteroffer. Id. In real-world transactions, however, 
whether an offer is “FRAND” or not is often a contentious issue; if the SEP-holder simply makes one 
offer and then refuses to negotiate and that offer turns out not to be FRAND, the SEP-holder could be 
subject to liability under both contract and antitrust laws. See generally Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233; In re Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
144061. Furthermore, given that under United States law, initial offers of SEP-holders need not be 
FRAND so long as a license on FRAND terms is eventually agreed upon, it is not clear in how many 
instances a single offer by the patent holder would actually discharge the holder’s obligation to 
provide a licensing offer on FRAND terms. See supra note 171.  
200 See Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 193, at 21-22 (“In our model, an injunction could be 
granted, if at all, only if a licensee refuses to accept court-certified RAND terms, which is unlikely to 
occur in practice . . . .”); See supra Section III(A)(i) and agency decisions supra Section III(A)(ii), for 
a discussion of United States caselaw. 
201 See Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 193, at 22. 
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D. Providing Clear Guidelines Regarding FRAND Negotiations and 
Injunction Safe Harbors Will Reduce Opportunistic Behavior of Both 
Parties 
 
For injunctions to serve the beneficial functions listed above, including 
the reduction of opportunistic behavior,202 parties need to understand the 
obligations they must discharge203 to take advantage of the injunction safe 
harbors. Guidelines laid out in Huawei v. ZTE provide one example of a 
useful framework which can reduce opportunistic behavior of the parties 
by providing guidance for FRAND negotiations.204 Huawei v. ZTE 
outlines the steps holders of FRAND-encumbered SEPs are required to 
take prior to pursuing an injunction as well as the expected behavior and 
responses of a willing licensee.205, 206  The Unwired Planet v. Huawei 
opinion further elucidated the nature of the FRAND undertaking207 and its 
relationship to competition law concerns.208 For instance, “the [c]ourt held 
that a FRAND undertaking is not just a contractual commitment to grant 
                                                        
202  See EU APPROACH TO SEPS, supra note 132, at 9 for a discussion on the benefits of a 
predictable enforcement environment for SEPs. For instance, the European Commission writes “A 
balanced and predictable enforcement environment has particularly positive effects on parties’ 
behavior during negotiations, which in turn can speed up the spread of standardised [sic] 
technologies.” EU APPROACH TO SEPS, supra note 132, at 9.   
203  See supra Section III(B)(i) for the safe harbor guidelines established by the European courts.  
204 Claudia Milbradt, Landmark Decisions on FRAND Licensing in Germany: What to Look out 
for in Negotiations, BUSINESS LAW MAGAZINE (Mar. 2017), http://www.businesslaw-
magazine.com/2017/11/23/landmark-decisions-on-frand-licensing-in-germany-what-to-look-out-for-
in-negotiations/.  “[T]he recent decisions can be used as guidance in negotiations between potential 
licensors and licensees.” Id.  
205  David Long, European Union High Court gives guidance on seeking injunctive relief on 
FRAND-encumbered SEPs (Huawei v. ZTE), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (July 16, 2013), 
https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2015/07/european-union-high-court-gives-guidance-on-seeking-
injunctive-relief-on-frand-encumbered-seps-huawei-v-zte/.  
206 To comply with its obligations a SEP owner must give notice to the infringer and provide a 
licensing offer via written FRAND terms. Id. The alleged infringer must likewise carry out its duties 
to show it is a willing licensee and to be able to invoke a FRAND defense during litigation. Id. “[A] 
willing licensee should act without delay, provide a counter-offer, and actively pay royalties (in trust 
or otherwise) for past and on-going use of the patent while the parties negotiate toward a FRAND 
license.” Id.; see supra Section III(B)(i), for a discussion of the case. 
207  Justice Birss underscored  
[A]n implementer who makes an unqualified commitment to take a licence [sic] on 
FRAND terms . . . cannot be the subject of a final injunction to restrain patent 
infringement. Whereas an implementer who refuses to take a licence [sic] on terms 
found by the court to be FRAND has chosen to have no licence, [sic] and so if they 
have been found to infringe a valid patent an injunction can be granted against them. 
Unwired Planet Nontechnical Trial, supra note 150, ¶ 806(5). 
208  Esther Ford & Michael Moore, Unwired Planet v Huawei: What are FRAND licence terms 
for Standard Essential Patents?, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5eab26c7-818a-4e61-8e58-eeb6d1970aaf.   
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licences [sic] on FRAND terms, but also to adopt a FRAND approach to 
the negotiation of such licences [sic].”209 The court also underscored that 
FRAND obligations are bilateral— in order to take advantage of FRAND 
defenses implementers are required to take a “FRAND approach”210 to 
negotiating the terms of the license.211 Thus, the Unwired Planet v. 
Huawei decision placed  injunctions in cases involving FRAND-
encumbered SEPs “firmly on the table”212 and demonstrated how the “best 
practices” laid out in Huawei v. ZTE can be used as flexible guidelines in 
licensing disputes.213  In effect, Huawei v. ZTE laid the groundwork to 
allow Justice Birss to enter an injunction against Huawei214 in the 
Unwired Planet v. Huawei dispute, and this injunction likely facilitated 
the discussions which led to a settled license between the two parties.215, 
216  Finally, the European Commission’s Communication Setting out the 
                                                        
209  Id.  
210 A “FRAND approach” is not clearly defined, however, it seems to essentially require good 
faith and fair dealing from each of the parties. Id. 
What constitutes a FRAND approach remains a grey area, but it does not mean that 
there is no scope for good faith opening offers and counter offers that fall short of 
FRAND and leave room for further negotiation. What is not a FRAND approach is 
“making extreme offers and taking an intransigent approach” (para 163) or creating a 
circumstance in which “it would be too easy for the recipient of an offer to throw up 
their hands and refuse to negotiate at all” (para 765). 
Id.  
211 Id.  
212 Aled Richards-Jones et al., Implications of FRAND Royalty Rate on Standard-Essential 
Patent Litigation, LEXOLOGY (June 28, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=953651c1-6347-427f-a4f1-6d584b621c02.  
213 In ruling on the allegation that Unwired Planet breached Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union by seeking an injunction before an offer on FRAND terms had 
been made to Huawei, Justice Birss indicated that the “safe harbor” laid out in Huawei v. ZTE was a 
collection of best practices for negotiations over SEPs, and that the inquiries of  whether the best 
practices were violated verses whether Article 102 was breached were distinct. Unwired Planet 
Nontechnical Trial, supra note 150, ¶ 744(i),(viii) (“In the judgment the CJEU has set out a scheme 
which both the patentee and implementer can be expected to follow in the context of a dispute about a 
patent declared essential to a standard and subject to a FRAND undertaking…. FRAND is justiciable 
and the undertaking can be effectively enforced at the suit of the defendant irrespective of Art 102.  
The defendant does not need Art 102 to have a defence [sic] to the injunction claim.”).  
214 For more information about the injunction Justice Birss ordered, see Pat Treacy & Matthew 
Hunt, Unwired Planet v Huawei: a new FRAND injunction, LEXOLOGY (June 7, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dff5d4f3-b6e8-4edd-8cd1-f2af2e81f240.  
215 To learn more about the settled license, see Nick Rudgard, High Court Rules on FRAND 
Patent Licenses, LEXOLOGY, (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=77da097d-f43d-48b8-b491-6a38619c3302.  
216 Other nations have implicitly acknowledged the importance of providing guidelines for 
negotiations involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs. For instance, in addition to the recent European 
decisions, Japan has begun an initiative to develop a world-class set of guidelines to govern standard-
essential patent licensing negotiations. Satoshi Watanabe, International report - Government requests 
guideline suggestions for standard-essential patent licence negotiation, IAM (Oct. 18, 2017), 
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European Union’s Approach to Standard Essential Patents consolidated 
national case law and provided further guidance on the application of the 
Huawei framework.217  
Thus, United States courts as well as the USITC should likewise 
develop a comprehensive framework for patent holders and potential 
licensees to follow in licensing disputes over FRAND-encumbered SEPs 
because such guidelines will encourage good-faith negotiations, facilitate 
innovation, and promote economic efficiency.   
CONCLUSION 
United States courts should grant injunctive relief in disputes involving 
FRAND-encumbered SEPS on a limited basis, including in circumstances 
where an implementer commits willful or knowing infringement in 
refusing to accept a FRAND license. The USITC should likewise be 
allowed to issue exclusion orders under similar circumstances in actions 
involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs.218 To ensure injunctions and 
exclusion orders under such circumstances are actually available,219 the 
                                                                                                                              
http://www.iam-media.com/reports/detail.aspx?g=080c3f5e-5c4f-41ce-b63d-6156a831512e.  The 
guidelines address common issues in licensing negotiations of SEPs, appropriate negotiation methods, 
and what constitutes reasonable royalties. Id. The Japan Patent Office solicited domestic and 
international input on the guidelines and expects to publish the guidelines this year. Id. Moreover, 
South Korea has addressed licensing negotiation concerning SEPs with the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission [hereinafter “KFTC”], amending guidelines regarding abuse of intellectual property 
rights in December of 2014. Yulchon LLC, Korean Antitrust Enforcer Amends Guidelines on Abuse 
of Intellectual Property Rights, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 9, 2015), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=82ab515c-145e-4e9b-9c6e-eebe5b34ca06. “The 
amended IP Guidelines provide more specific guidance on whether certain conduct, including that by 
an NPE [Non-Practicing Entity] or SEP, is likely to constitute IPR abuse.” Id. In China, the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce [hereinafter “SAIC”] addressed the licensing of SEPs 
through its Rules on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of 
Eliminating or Restricting Competition, which went into force on August 1, 2015. Hao Zhan & Jing 
He, Authority scrutiny of SEP and FRAND issues in China, LEXOLOGY, (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b0e46621-083f-4006-9fbc-a22ee88d1d3f. 
217 See supra Section III (A)-(B), for discussion of European precedent. 
218 See supra Section III (A)(ii)(A), for USITC’s policies regarding the issuance of exclusion 
orders.  
219 If no clear guidelines for the obligations of the parties are outlined, the courts and 
administrative agencies may be more hesitant in granting injunctive or exclusionary relief because 
there may be a question of insufficient notice to the parties of the specific nature of their duties and 
the potential consequences. Additionally, since United States courts have been hesitant to grant 
injunctions in cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs, without clear guidelines outlining 
expectations for FRAND negotiations, the courts may continue withholding this relief to avoid 
disrupting party expectations. See supra Section III (A)(i), for discussion of United States case law in 
this area.  
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FRAND obligations of parties for negotiations should be clarified.220  The 
United States judicial and administrative bodies may examine the recent 
Huawei v. ZTE decision for an example of a framework221 of best 
practices for negotiations over FRAND-encumbered SEPs and Unwired 
Planet v. Huawei for an illustration of how this framework can be applied 
in a flexible manner.222 By providing guidelines for the duties of each 
party in FRAND negotiations and ensuring holders of SEPs have access to 
injunctive relief the United States will encourage parties to engage in 
good-faith negotiations, facilitate innovation and participation in the 
standard-setting process, and promote economic efficiency.223 
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220 This can be accomplished through judicial opinions and through the issuance of guidelines 
by the relevant administrative agencies.  
221  See supra Section III (B)(i)(A), for discussion of the guidelines set out in Huawei v. ZTE.  
222 See supra Section III (B)(i)(B), for discussion of the guidelines set out in Unwired Planet v. 
Huawei.  
223 See Luke Froeb & Mikhael Shor, supra note 184, at 10 (“Curtailing injunctive relief … 
pose[s] the risk of under-rewarding innovators for their investments. This is likely to retard 
innovation, reduce incentives to participate in standards, and reduce economic welfare.”).  
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